In February 2026, Milwaukee Police Officer Josue Ayala was charged with misconduct after allegedly using Flock’s automated license plate reader (ALPR) network to track the movements of a romantic partner and that person’s former partner. Investigators found that he had searched their vehicles 179 times. Ayala pleaded guilty to attempted misconduct in June and resigned from the department. Then came another case. In July, Milwaukee Police Detective Tehrangi Chapman was charged with misconduct after allegedly using the same system to track two people 20 times. Chapman had also been assigned to investigate Ayala’s misconduct.
Think about what that means. The officer responsible for investigating the misuse of a surveillance system was himself accused of misusing it. These are not hypothetical concerns about what might happen someday. They are documented cases involving officers who had access to a powerful surveillance network and allegedly used it for purposes unrelated to legitimate law enforcement.
And Milwaukee is not the only Wisconsin community where ALPR misuse has raised concerns. Reported cases involving officers elsewhere in the state, including Menasha and Kenosha County, show that the problem extends beyond one department. We cannot know how many incidents have gone undetected, but the cases that have surfaced raise serious questions about whether existing oversight is sufficient.
Local Control Is Not Enough to Stop Mass Surveillance
Over the past year, communities across Wisconsin have begun reconsidering their relationships with Flock Safety and debating whether automated license plate readers belong in their communities at all. Some municipalities have moved to end their contracts, others have pivoted to other ALPR vendors, Appleton has banned broad usage of ALPRs with limited exceptions, while others have explored different approaches to surveillance technology.
These local grassroots successes matter, but they do not resolve the larger problem. Wisconsin still lacks any statewide protections establishing what law enforcement agencies can do with ALPR data, how long they can retain it, who can access it and what happens when an officer abuses that access. More importantly, even when one municipality decides to reject ALPRs, its residents can still be tracked by cameras operated in neighboring communities.
We believe in local control. Communities should have the authority to decide how their police departments operate and what technologies they are willing to adopt. Wisconsin should pass legislation that encourages greater local control over surveillance technology generally, requires meaningful public participation before agencies acquire new surveillance capabilities and ensures elected local leaders have a say in how these technologies are deployed. Decisions about surveillance should not be made exclusively by police departments, private technology companies, or law enforcement administrators behind closed doors.
But automated license plate readers present a different problem. Unlike many other surveillance technologies that are primarily deployed to monitor activity within a particular city, county or municipality, ALPR networks are specifically designed to track people’s movements across jurisdictional boundaries. Their value to law enforcement comes from connecting location data collected by cameras across different communities, creating a searchable record of where people have traveled and when.
Wisconsinites do not stay within the boundaries of one municipality. They travel between cities and counties every day to get to work, attend school, visit family, shop, worship, receive medical care and participate in their communities. Under a widespread ALPR network, these ordinary activities can result in someone’s vehicle being scanned and their location recorded repeatedly as they travel through different communities. People should not have to accept having their movements systematically documented simply because they need to go about their daily lives.
This is why local control alone cannot adequately address ALPR surveillance. A community’s decision to reject the technology does not prevent its residents from being tracked by cameras elsewhere. Nor does it prevent their location data from being shared across jurisdictions through interconnected private databases. The result is a surveillance infrastructure that follows people across municipal and county borders, regardless of the privacy protections their own local government has chosen to adopt.
Wisconsin needs state legislation that recognizes this distinction. The Legislature should establish strong local democratic control over surveillance technology generally, but it should go further with ALPRs by banning their use by public agencies statewide. A patchwork of local policies cannot adequately protect residents from a technology designed to operate across those very boundaries.
This Is a Bipartisan Privacy Issue
Concern about ALPRs is not limited to one political party. Republican U.S. Senator Josh Hawley has held congressional hearings examining the privacy and national security implications of Flock’s surveillance network. Meanwhile, progressive lawmakers including Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Sen. Bernie Sanders and Sen. Jeff Merkley introduced the federal Ban Flock Act in October 2026, which would prohibit federal agencies from using ALPR technology and restrict federal funding for state and local governments that use it. These developments demonstrate that concerns about mass surveillance extend across the political spectrum.
That concern is understandable. People should be able to visit a gun range, attend a protest, seek reproductive healthcare, worship at a church or meet with a political organizer without having their movements automatically added to a database that can later be searched by law enforcement or shared with other agencies.
Nobody is arguing that police shouldn’t investigate crime. The real question is why the government needs to collect and retain information about the movements of people who are not suspected of doing anything wrong.
The Potential for Abuse Goes Beyond Individual Officers
Wisconsin’s documented cases of officer misconduct illustrate how ALPR technology can be abused at an individual level. An officer with access to sensitive movement data may use it to stalk a former partner, investigate a romantic interest or obtain information for personal reasons. These are not legitimate law enforcement activities, and policies against misconduct are only effective when violations can be detected and consequences follow.
But the potential consequences extend beyond individual officers. A large surveillance network can also be used to monitor political demonstrations, identify people attending controversial events or track the movements of individuals whom government officials consider political opponents. Such abuses could threaten freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the ability to participate in democratic life.
The problem becomes more complicated when private companies collect, store and share information through systems used by multiple law enforcement agencies. Companies have financial incentives to expand their products, increase their customer base and make their databases more useful. Those incentives do not necessarily align with the public’s interest in minimizing the collection and sharing of sensitive information.
We should not assume that every officer will abuse their access or that every company will misuse the information it holds. But privacy protections should be designed around the reality that people and institutions can misuse power, not around the assumption that they never will.
There is also an important distinction between public and privately operated surveillance infrastructure. Even if Wisconsin bans public agencies from operating ALPR networks, law enforcement access to privately owned cameras can still create serious privacy concerns. The Legislature must establish meaningful limits on how police departments can request, obtain, search and share information collected through privately owned cameras. Public agencies should not be able to circumvent a statewide ALPR ban by relying on private surveillance networks to accomplish the same mass tracking of residents.
Privacy Should Not Depend on Who Is President
This is also a federal problem. The federal government has repeatedly expanded or retained powerful surveillance authorities across administrations, demonstrating why privacy protections cannot depend on which political party occupies the White House.
After September 11, President George W. Bush authorized surveillance programs that included warrantless collection of domestic telephone records. President Barack Obama continued the use and expansion of major national security surveillance authorities. President Donald Trump signed legislation reauthorizing Section 702 surveillance during his first term, and President Joe Biden signed the 2024 law that renewed and expanded aspects of that authority. President Trump’s second administration has continued to operate within this broader surveillance framework.
Wisconsin should not assume that federal authorities will always use information responsibly or that future administrations will share today’s priorities. Our leaders should not wait for Washington to act before protecting its own residents. State lawmakers have an opportunity to prevent local surveillance infrastructure from becoming another source of information available to federal authorities and other outside agencies.
Privacy Is Essential to Every Other Freedom
The ACLU of Wisconsin’s position is that the strongest way to protect residents from the risks of ALPR surveillance is to ban the technology altogether. AI-powered surveillance capabilities are expanding rapidly, while lawmakers and public institutions struggle to establish safeguards that keep pace. Once a system of widespread data collection becomes embedded in everyday policing, limiting its use can become increasingly difficult.
Privacy is not an obstacle to democracy. It is one of the conditions that allows democracy to function. People are more free to speak, organize, worship and challenge those in power when they are not constantly concerned that their movements and associations are being recorded.A statewide ban is not an argument against investigating crime or giving communities the ability to make decisions about their own public safety. It is an acknowledgment that continuously collecting the location data of millions of people who have done nothing wrong is an unacceptable intrusion into their privacy. We should not have to choose between public safety and the basic freedom to move through our communities without being tracked.