KNOW YOUR RIGHTS:
This page was established so you can find laws and court cases that affect youth. We have provided many, but certainly not all, of the references young people need. We are in the process of building the library to better assist you, so keep checking for new material.
If there is a law or case that you would like to see here, let the Council Director know.
THE CONTENTS OF THIS PAGE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED LEGAL ADVICE OR BE USED IN PLACE OF CONSULTING WITH AN ATTORNEY.
table of contents:
You can either just click on the area of your interest and be brought to that topic, or scroll down through the library to look at the cases.
- Bill of Rights
- Curfew
- Dress Code
- Student Search
- Student Clubs-Right to Access
- Drug Testing in School
- Religion/School Prayer
- Book Censorship
- Speech Code/Hate Speech
- Expulsion/Suspension
- Subversive (Rebellious) Advocacy
- Freedom of Assembly
- Freedom of Speech/ Student Press
- Equality in Education
- Equal Protection/Gender Classifications
- Equal Protection-Race Based Classifications
- Reproductive Freedom
- Birth Control
- Links
bill of rights
**In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)This case established the right of young people to procedural rights under the 14th Amendment prior to being committed to a juvenile home. The case came out of a complaint by a neighbor that 15 year old Gerald Gault made an obscene phone call to her. Based on that complaint , Gault was arrested and the steps the police took after that were found to be inconsistent with the 14th Amendment. No notice was left for Gault’s parents, the petition filed by the arresting officer was not seen by the parents until 2 months later, and common procedures (swearing of witnesses, making a record of the hearing and having the complainant present) were not followed. The Supreme Court held that "…neither the 14th Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." The Court concluded that a juvenile in a juvenile proceeding had the right to due process of law, including the right to notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to be advised that he need not incriminate himself, and the right to confront and cross examine his accusers.
curfew
**City of Milwaukee v. KF 426 N.W. 2d 329 (Wis. 1988)This case concerned the constitutionality of the Milwaukee curfew ordinance, which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found to be constitutional. The case arose from citations issued by the MPD to approximately 95 youth who were at a dance at the War Memorial Center sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Black Student Union. The purpose of the dance was the promotion of higher education and was overseen by several adults, security personnel, and police officers. The MPD, who were at the War Memorial Center because they had received complaints of vehicle thefts in the area, requested that the individuals in charge of the dance advise the attendees of the curfew ordinance and request that youth under 17 leave the premises by 11:00 PM. The Officers returned to the dance shortly after 11:00 PM and were advised of vandalization to the vending machines and discovered graffiti associated with certain gangs. The police officers then entered the dance and observed approximately 70 people under 17. The dance was stopped and those who appeared to be under 17 were stopped and questioned. Those who were under 17 were arrested and taken to the police administration building. The juveniles whose parents arrived to pick them up were permitted to leave without citation and there is a dispute if the other juveniles were permitted to call their parents prior to being taken to the police administration building.
K.F. (15 years old) and D.A. (16 years old) were charged with violating the curfew; they pleaded not guilty. They also filed motions to dismiss the charges on the basis that the curfew ordinance was vague and overbroad. The trial court denied their motion and found the ordinance constitutional, and found the two guilty of violating the ordinance. On appeal the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the interest of the city in protecting youths and curtailing juvenile crime is compelling and that the ordinance restricts the movement of juveniles for only a narrow part of the day in "public" places. The Court found the ordinance to be drawn as narrowly as practicable and because they found that the ordinance met the strict scrutiny standard requiring a "compelling state interest" it was unnecessary to determine whether they would adopt a less stringent "significant state interest" standard as applied in Carey V. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, with respect to juveniles.
**JFF, In Interest of, 473 N.W. 2d 546 (Wis. App. 1991)
This case arose when a juvenile claimed he was illegally searched, and thus the cocaine that was result of the search should be suppressed. The search occurred after two Milwaukee police officers observed J.F.F. and another person walking together on the street at 1:25 AM. J.F.F. was carrying a stereo speaker with a wire dangling off the back of it. The police officers stopped J.F.F. because they suspected the speaker had been "taken in a burglary or through the commission of some other crime." They also patted him down and found no weapons or cocaine. J.F.F. told the officers that they were on their way home. The officers determined that J.F.F. was a juvenile and arrested him for violating curfew.
The trial court held that the initial stop was lawful and appropriate and the pat down search was also appropriate. It held that the arrest for curfew violation was unlawful and that the cocaine obtained from the subsequent search should be suppressed, as it was not in "plain view". The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found that the arrest was not lawful and the search incident to that arrest "exceeded the scope of the officer’s authority." In relation to the curfew violation the Court stated that it would not rewrite legislation allowing a child to be taken into custody for a curfew violation, not wishing to substitute their judgment for the legislatures.
dress code
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of dress codes in relation to students 1st Amendment rights. Personal appearance and clothing may be constitutionally protected by the 1st Amendment if the clothing conveys a religious message or the clothing coveys a political message. It is generally not enough in the eyes of the court for a student to object to a dress code on the basis that it does not allow him/her to convey their individuality. The following lists includes a few of the very numerous cases out there on dress codes. Remember a court only must follow precedent in its jurisdiction. Since the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled, this is generally the District or State Supreme Court rulings.
**Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D. Ill. 1979)
The US District Court ruled that students were exempt form the gym class dress code and the gym class itself due to religious beliefs. The students were members of the United Pentecostal Church which has deep religious beliefs in how one should dress.
**Domico v. Rapides Parish School Board, 75 F. 2d 100 (5th Circuit 1982)
In this case the 5th Circuit reiterated its past attitude about the importance of school boards protecting a school systems educational and disciplinary needs through the implementation of a "hairstyle regulation." This case actually involved the school board applying the student dress code to all employees as well as students. The court said that a school board has a legitimate interest in "teaching, hygiene, instilling discipline, asserting authority and compelling uniformity." It stated that person’s appearance may have an adverse impact on the educational process and, as such, barring any arbitrary or capricious acts, can be regulated.
**Olesen v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp 820 (N.D. Ill 1987)
High school students brought suit against the school district, challenging the constitutionality of school anti-gang rule prohibiting the wearing of earrings by males. The court upheld the high school’s anti-gang policy, saying it did not violate the students right to free speech and expression, since the only message was on of his individuality, which was not within the protected scope of the 1st Amendment. The court found nothing wrong with not allowing males to wear earrings while allowing females to wear earrings. The court felt the gender-based difference in classification was substantially related to the legitimate objective of discouraging gang membership and activities.
**Broussard V. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526 ( E.D. Virginia 1992)
A middle school student brought an action against the school board and other related parties to challenge their suspension for wearing a shirt that said "Drugs Suck!" The District Court held that a one day suspension did not violate due process and free speech rights.
**Jenglin v. San Jacinto Unified School Dist., 872 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993)
The District Court upheld the anti-gang dress code which prohibited clothing identifying professional sports teams or colleges, for the high school, stating that it did not offend the Constitution because of the threat of violence created by the gang presence in the high school. Schools are given a great deal of deference regarding clothing which promotes or shows gang affiliation because most courts view gangs to be socially problematic. If a school district can not prove a gang problem exists, the justification for such a rule will be weak in the eyes of the court. This court ruled at the same time that the code violated the free speech rights of elementary and middle school students, as no gang problems could be shown to exist at their schools.
**Colorado Indep. School Dist. v. Barber, 864 S.W. 2d 806 (Tex. App. Eastland 1993)
In this case male students successfully challenged enforcement of a school dress code which prohibited male students form having long hair or from wearing earrings. The court felt that there were several problems with the dress code, most significantly that the code prohibitions were discriminatory, as they were based on sex.
**Alabama v. Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Big Sandy School Dist, 817 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993)
In this case the court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the school from enforcing a hair regulation against Native American students who asserted that the maintenance of their long hair represented moral and spiritual strength. The court found this to be a symbol of their religion and thus it was protected as a matter of religious freedom.
**McInyre v. Bethel School Indep. Dist. No. 3, 804 F. Supp 1415 (W.D. Ok. 1992)
In this case the school district applied a dress code restriction to T-shirts bearing a logo considered to be an ad for alcohol. The U.S. District Court held that the school district failed to show that wearing the restricted clothing would interfere with school work or school discipline. In this case, the court held that it was very difficult to tell if the T-shirt advertised alcohol and that the rationale for the rule would not work in this specific situation. The standard for determining whether the 1st Amendment requires the school to tolerate expression is whether or not the speech would materially and substantially interfere with the school work, school discipline or the rights of other students.
**Hines v. Caston School Corp., 651 N.E. 2d 330 (Ind. App 1995)
This case was brought when a ten year old boy was suspended for wearing an earring. The trial court ruled that the rule prohibiting the wearing of earrings by boys did not violate the constitutional rights of the boy under the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment. The court ruled that the Hineses failed to show that the earring ban serves no purpose rationally related to the educational function of the school, and as a result their due process challenge failed. The court also affirmed the trial courts ruling that the Hineses failed to show that the prohibition of the wearing of earrings by boys violates the equal protection clause because it does not substantially relate to a legitimate government interest.
**Pyle v. South Hadley School Committee, 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994)
In this case two high school students sued the school committee, challenging the school’s policy which prohibited their wearing of two T-shirts. One read "See Dick Drink. See Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don’t be a Dick" and the other read "Coed Naked Band: Do It to the Rhythm". The District Court held that school officials could restrict vulgar expression by students regardless if their was any risk of substantial disruption, but that a dress code which prohibits apparel which harasses violates the students’ 1st Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit denied the motion to intervene and did not disturb the district courts judgment in relation to the enjoined enforcement of the harassment provision.
**Bivens v. Albuquerque Public Schools, 899 F. Supp 556 (D. New Mexico, 1995)
In this case a student brought an action against the school board, based on a claim that the dress code prohibiting saggy pants violated students’ 1st Amendment rights, and the procedures used in imposing the long term suspension violated the student’s right to procedural due process The District Court held that the wearing of saggy pants was not speech and the dress code was not unconstitutionally vague.

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